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Abstract Research by The Psychological Record, 64(3),
433–440. doi:10.1007/s40732-014-0052-9, (2014) demon-
strated the novel finding that the magnitude effect for medical
outcomes does not reverse across delay and probability
discounting as it does for monetary outcomes. We suggest that
a possible reason for the lack of a reverse magnitude effect in
nonmonetary outcomes is incomparable divisibility of
discounted alternatives.
To test whether the lack of a reverse magnitude effect in
probability discounting of medical outcomes is due to incom-
parable divisibility of treatment effects, 4 studies were con-
ducted. In the replication study, the effect observed by The
Psychological Record, 64(3), 433–440. doi:10.1007/s40732-
014-0052-9, (2014) was marginally not significant, although it
was directionally consistent with their prediction of steeper
discounting of small medical outcomes (as compared to large,
defined as brain cancer) both in time and probability
discounting. Our manipulation by substituting a divisible out-
come (body paralysis) for an indivisible one (brain cancer) did
not, however, bring expected results. We discuss the explana-
tions and possible implications of introduced division for di-
visible and nondivisible medical outcomes.
Keywords Delay discounting . Probability discounting .
Money .Medical treatment . Domain specific discounting .
Divisibilityof alternatives .Divisible andnondivisiblemedical
outcomes . Reversemagnitude effect
Choices in which at least one payment is delayed are referred
to as intertemporal choices. In such situations, the decision
maker chooses between a smaller earlier or larger later pay-
ment. Choices in which at least one payment is only probable
are referred to as choices under risk. In such situations, the
decision maker considers the choice of certain payment or
payment with a given probability (see Madden & Bickel,
2010, for reviews).
A subjective decrease in the value of an amount with an
increase of delay or uncertainty is referred to as discounting
(Mazur, 1987; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991). In the case of
intertemporal choices, strong discounting of the delayed
amount shows unwillingness to wait and preference for the
lower, immediate payment. In the case of choices under risk,
strong discounting of the uncertain amount signals aversion to
risk and preference for the lower amount without risk.
Existing studies show that the magnitude of an amount
affects the process of discounting delayed and risky payments
to varying degrees. In the case of intertemporal choices, small-
er amounts are discounted more strongly than larger amounts,
and in the case of choices under risk, the effect is reversed:
larger amounts are discounted more strongly than smaller
amounts (Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002; Estle, Green,
Myerson, &Holt, 2006; Myerson, Green, Scott, Holt, & Estle,
2003; Vanderveldt, Green, & Myerson, 2015).
The different effects are explained by feelings of disap-
pointment characteristic of choices under risk (Loewenstein
& Lerner, 2003). In light of this interpretation, the uncertain
larger amount is discounted more strongly than the uncertain
smaller amount, since the larger the amount, the greater the
potential disappointment when a lottery outcome is unfavor-
able. In the case of intertemporal choices, both alternatives are
certain, so disappointment is not an issue. If there is no risk of
disappointment, people prefer to wait and are more willing to
wait if the delayed amount is larger.
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A recent study ofWeatherly and Terrell (2014) showed that
reversal of the magnitude effect when discounting probable
amounts is a characteristic only of monetary alternatives and
that this disappears when discounting nonmonetary alterna-
tives. In a series of studies the researchers focused on delay
and probability discounting of monetary ($100 or $100,000)
and medical (acne or brain cancer) outcomes. Although for
monetary outcomes they replicated results observed in the
literature (the magnitude effect – steeper discounting of the
small outcome than the large outcome in the case of delay
discounting; and the reverse magnitude effect – steeper
discounting of the large outcome than the small outcome for
probability discounting), they did not find a reverse magnitude
effect for probability discounting in the case of medical out-
comes. The above results raise the question of whether
discounting of nonmonetary alternatives is subject to different
discounting processes than discounting of monetary alterna-
tives or whether Weatherly and Terrell’s (2014) results were
an artefact of the procedure used.
We argue that a possible reason for the lack of a reverse
magnitude effect in nonmonetary outcomes is incomparable di-
visibility of treatment effects in Weatherly and Terrell’s ap-
proach. There are plenty of similar situations in real life: a person
would probably accept a different level of risk in a competition if
all players were compensated according to their performance
(the result therefore being divisible) compared to a situation
where one winner takes everything (a nondivisible result). Sim-
ilarly, having one ski probably has as much utility as having no
ski at all, since, when compared to having two skis, having one
ski is almost useless, and its utility is close to zero. This can be
understood in terms of a dramatically different curvature in the
utility function for different goods. Having half of an initial
monetary value gives you more or less half of the initial utility
(depending on your money-utility function), while there are
some goods where utility is either all or nothing. A similar type
of reasoning is probably also applicable in many domains not
involving money or goods (e.g., with respect to ailments such as
brain cancer in the medical domain).
Weatherly and Terrell (2014) used acne and brain cancer as
discounted medical states. However, in our opinion, these
states differ not only in magnitude (of potential negative ef-
fects) but also in divisibility. High divisibility applies in the
case of acne. Treatment efficacy translates into the number of
pimples on the face. In this sense, acne treatment effects are
divisible (and having half as many pimples probably makes
one feel better). But the situation is different in the case of
brain cancer: here we cannot speak about divisibility of treat-
ment effects. As in the case of pregnancy, one cannot have
brain cancer partially. If the treatment does not treat the cancer
fully, for the person being treated the risk of death still exists
(thus, having a brain tumor half as small as it was initially does
not make one much happier). If the risk remains, the person
involved is motivated to overvalue treatment efficacy, which
influences the discounting rate so that increased treatment
efficacy translates into a decrease of the discounting rate.
Thus, we suggest that the lack of divisibility of treatment
effects in the case of brain cancer resulted in Weatherly and
Terrell’s failure to obtain the reverse magnitude effect for non-
monetary outcomes. We hypothesized that replacement of brain
cancer with a disease whose treatment effects are divisible (e.g.,
body paralysis) would restore the reverse magnitude effect for
nonmonetary outcomes (having full body paralysis is probably
far worse than having one’s legs paralyzed, which is far worse
than having one leg paralyzed). We therefore aimed to replicate
Weatherly and Terrell’s (2014) finding using a nongradable dis-
ease, and hypothesized that:
H1. In the case of a nongradable disease (brain cancer),
the magnitude effect for medical outcomes does not re-
verse between delay and probability discounting as it
does for monetary outcomes.
We also aimed to demonstrate that the effect disappears in
the case of a gradable disease (e.g., partial body paralysis) and
hypothesized that:
H2: In the case of a gradable disease (partial body paral-
ysis), the magnitude effect for medical outcomes reverses




The study protocol was approved by the Institutional Review
Board at Kozminski University. To test H1 and H2, four stud-
ies were conducted (see Table 1). The first two concerned
delay discounting and the last two concerned probability
discounting. Studies 1 and 3 were exact replications of
Table 1 Summary of conducted studies
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Weatherly and Terrell’s (2014) experiments. In Studies 2 and
4, brain cancer was replaced by body paralysis.
All four studies were conducted in parallel using the Am-
azonMechanical Turk (MTurk) and the LimeSurvey platform.
Only people with at least a 95 % prior approval rate were
invited to participate. Shortly after giving their informed con-
sent, participants were randomly distributed to one of the four
studies mentioned in Table 1. The average time taken to per-
form the study was M=9.39 minutes (SD=4.41; with no sig-
nificant differences between experimental conditions). All
participants received a payment of $0.40 USD.
Procedure for Studies 1 and 2: Delay Discounting
Investigations
Study 1 was an exact replication of the experiments done by
Weatherly and Terrell (2014). In Study 2, brain cancer was
replaced by body paralysis.
When medical treatments were discounted participants
read the following instructions:
Suppose you were suffering from acne (brain cancer/
body paralysis). Your physician informs you that you
will need to wait X (time) before obtaining a treatment
that is 100 % effective. However, you could immediately
begin a treatment that has a lesser chance of success.
What minimum percent chance of success would you be
willing to accept for the different treatment in order to
choose it rather than waiting X (time)?
When monetary outcomes were discounted, participants
read the same in both studies:
If you won $100 ($100,000) and were not going to get
the money for X (time), what is the smallest amount of
money you would accept today rather than having to
wait X (time)?
Similarly to the original study, the question was repeated 5
times in succession to gather answers for 5 delay periods
(6 months, 1 year, 3 years, 5 years, 10 years – the periods
being presented in random order), for each outcome size (large
vs. small magnitude), for each domain (monetary vs. medical).
Thus, in total 20 questions were asked at this stage (5×2×2).
The order of particular delay periods was randomized within
each of four blocks (medical small, medical large, monetary
small, monetary large); also, the blocks themselves were pre-
sented in random order. Participants were able to move to
another block only after answering all five questions from a
previous block; however, at any stage participants were
allowed to use a Bback^ button to inspect and correct previous
answers.We used a slider-type scale, with end points labeled 0
and 100 % for the medical conditions and 0 to $100 / $100,
000 for the monetary conditions; 2 % increments (e.g., 2 %,
$2, or $2,000) were used to gather answers instead of the radio
button cafeteria-type scale used in the original study. In an
online approach, including 50 radio buttons within one col-
umn would require scrolling to access higher values (the pos-
sibility of anchoring therefore existing), while breaking things
into two columns could have resulted in anchoring answers
with respect to the top of each column.
Procedure for Studies 3 and 4: Probability Discounting
Investigations
Study 3 was an exact replication of the experiments performed
by Weatherly and Terrell (2014). In Study 4, brain cancer was
replaced by body paralysis.
When monetary outcomes were discounted, participants
read the following instructions:
You are a finalist in a national sweepstake. You have a
X% chance of winning $100 ($100,000). However, if
your number is not called, you do not receive anything.
The organization running the sweepstake is willing to
guarantee to pay you a certain amount of money if you
would agree to remove your name from the sweepstake.
What is the smallest amount of money you would be
willing to accept rather than having a X% chance of
winning $100 ($100,000)?
When medical treatments were discounted, participants
read the same in both studies:
Suppose you were suffering from acne (brain cancer).
Your physician informs you that there are two treatment
options. The first one completely cures the disease, but it
only works for X% of the patients who choose it. The
second treatment is guaranteed to work, but it only par-
tially treats the disease. You can only afford to choose
one treatment. What is the minimum percentage of suc-
cess that the second treatment would need to guarantee
for you to choose it over the first treatment?
Again, we used a slider-type scale, with endings labeled 0
and 100 % for the medical conditions and 0 to $100 / $100,
000 for the monetary conditions; 2 % increments were used
(e.g., 2 %, $2, or $2,000). Similar to the original study, each
question was repeated 5 times in a row to gather answers for
five probability levels – 1%, 10%, 50%, 90%, and 99% – all
presented in random order, for each outcome size (large vs.
small magnitude), for each domain (monetary vs. medical).
Thus, again, in total 20 questions were asked at this stage
(5×2×2). The order of particular probability levels was ran-
domized within each of the four blocks (medical small, med-
ical large, monetary small, monetary large), and the blocks
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themselves were also presented in random order. Again, par-
ticipants were able to move to the next block only after an-
swering all five questions from a previous block; however, at
any stage participants were allowed to use a Bback^ button to
inspect and correct previous answers.
Data Analysis
Exclusionary criteria were identical to those used by
Weatherly and Terrell (2014). We identified instances
in which indifference points were not monotonically de-
creasing with time or probability (e.g., participants were
excluded when they wanted to receive more for longer
than for shorter delays, or wanted to receive more for
less probable than more probable results). Thus, with
respect to all outcomes, for any single participant, no
indifference point could be greater than the one imme-
diately preceding it.
Data for participants whose choices met the criterion for
systematic discounting were analyzed by calculating the area
under the curve (AUC; Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana,
2001) using the formula (a2 – a1)[(b1+b2)/2], where standard-
ized a1 and a2 are consecutive delays in months (or probabil-
ities) while b1 and b2 represent consecutive subjective values
of delayed (or uncertain) payoffs. This method allows calcu-
lation of the speed of a value’s decrease as the delay (or un-
certainty) increases. The lower the AUC, the greater the dim-
inution from the starting value because of delaying (or making
more uncertain) the starting value.
Closing Questionnaire
To show that the results presented by Weatherly and
Terrell (2014) depended on the divisibility of the medical
condition we conducted a manipulation check at the end
of each study. Participants were asked about their hypo-
thetical worry (using a slider-type question with responses
on a 0- to 100-point scale) if suffering from both low- and
high-intensity variants of acne, brain cancer, or body pa-
ralysis. Moreover, participants were asked to provide de-
mographic information and asked whether they had any
history of medical conditions related to those researched
in the study. Additionally, to validate the Amazon Turk
sample, at the end of the questionnaire, a question apply-
ing a new tool for detecting participants who had not
followed instructions was added: the instructional manip-
ulation check (IMC), as suggested by Oppenheimer,
Meyvis, and Davidenko (2009). This asked participants
about sports activities they engaged in regularly, with
lengthy and boring instructions explaining why it was so
important, and at the end there was a request in small
print for participants to ignore the question and type their
year of birth into a text box below.
Results
Studies 1 and 2: Delay Discounting Investigations
The original sample of participants consisted of 167 people
enrolled from Amazon’s MTurk worker pool.1 After
employing the exclusionary criteria (which were exactly the
same as in Weatherly and Terrell’s, 2014, study) the final
sample of participants for Studies 1 and 2 consisted of 86
people (see Table 2).
The exclusion rates for the delay discounting studies (Stud-
ies 1 and 2) reported in Table 2 were similar to the 49 % rate
reported in the study of Weatherly and Terrell (2014).2
Figure 1 presents the mean AUC values for the small and
large magnitude monetary and medical-treatment outcomes in
the delay discounting conditions. The left panel, A, presents
the results of Study 1 (a pure replication of Weatherly and
Terrell’s study, with brain cancer as the Blarge magnitude^
medical condition), while Panel B, on the right, presents the
Study 2 results, with brain cancer replaced by body paralysis.
In all groups, the larger outcome was discounted more
steeply than the smaller outcome. In Study 1, a repeated mea-
sures ANOVA on rates of discounting identified a statistically
significant difference in discounting strength between the
smaller and larger monetary amounts, F(1, 41)=31.11;
p=.001; η2=.431. However, the difference in discounting
strength between the smaller and larger magnitude medical
outcomes (acne vs. brain cancer) was marginally nonsignifi-
cant, F(1, 41)=2.94; p=.094; η2=.067. In Study 2 we found a
higher discount rate for smaller monetary outcomes than larg-
er outcomes, F(1, 43)=24.09; p=.001; η2=.359, as well as for
the smaller as compared to the larger magnitude medical con-
dition, F(1, 43)=7.41; p=.009; η2=.147.
Moreover, the results showed statistically significance dif-
ferences between the large monetary and large magnitude
medical outcomes in Study 1: $100,000 vs. brain cancer,
F(1, 41)=24.53; p=.001; η2=.374, and in Study 2: $100,
000 vs. body paralysis,F(1, 43)=5.84; p=.020; η2=.120. This
suggests that large medical conditions are discounted more
strongly than large monetary outcomes. However, this was
not the case for small outcomes: In both Study 1, F(1, 41)=
3.50; p=.068; η2=.079, and Study 2, F(1, 43)=.24; p=.627;
η2=.006, differences in discounting strength for small magni-
tude medical outcomes (acne) and small monetary outcomes
($100) were nonsignificant (p>.05).
1 TheMTurk sample was also used successfully for previous discounting
studies (Hardisty, Appelt, & Weber 2013a)
2 Using the algorithm for identifying nonsystematic data proposed by
Johnson and Bickel (2008) resulted in exclusion rates of 53 % and
49 % for Studies 1 and 2, respectively. However, in the interests of
comparability, we used the simplified criterion proposed by Weatherly
and Terrell (2014).
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Studies 3 and 4: Probability Discounting Investigations
The original sample of participants consisted of 143 people
enrolled from Amazon’s MTurk worker pool. After
employing the exclusionary criteria, the final sample across
both studies consisted of 97 participants (see Table 3).
The exclusion rates for the probability discounting studies
(Studies 3 and 4) reported in Table 3 were identical to that
reported in Weatherly and Terrell’s (2014) study (28 %).3
Figure 2 presents the mean AUC values for the small and
large magnitude monetary and medical-treatment outcomes in
the probability discounting conditions: Panel A, on the left,
depicting the Study 3 results (the replication study), and Panel
B, on the right, depicting the Study 4 results (with the brain
cancer condition replaced by the body paralysis condition).
In Study 3, participants more strongly discounted larger
monetary outcomes when compared to smaller monetary out-
comes, F(1, 49)=8.09; p=.006; η2=.142. Although from
Figure 2 it might appear that smaller magnitude medical out-
comes (acne) were discountedmore steeply than largemedical
outcomes (brain cancer), the repeated measures ANOVA
showed that this was not the case – the difference was mar-
ginally not significant, F(1, 49)=3.38; p=.072; η2=.064. In
Study 4, participants more strongly discounted larger mone-
tary outcomes when compared to smaller monetary outcomes,
F(1, 46)=19.65; p=.001; η2=.299. For medical outcomes
(body paralysis vs. acne), however, the difference in
discounting strength was not significant, F(1, 46)= .04;
p=.847; η2=.001.4
Results also showed statistically significant differences be-
tween large magnitudemonetary and large magnitude medical
treatment outcomes in both Study 3 ($100,000 vs. brain can-
cer), F(1, 49)=33.95; p=.001; η2=.409, and Study 4 ($100,
000 vs. body paralysis), F(1, 46)=39.98; p=.001; η2=.465.
Finally, significant differences were also found between small
magnitude medical treatment outcomes and small monetary
outcomes in Study 3 ($100 vs. acne), F(1, 49)=12.548;
p=.001; η2=.204, and Study 4 ($100 vs. acne), F(1, 46)=
34.113; p=.001; η2=.426. These results all suggest that mon-
etary outcomes are discounted more strongly than medical
outcomes when comparing small–small and large–large mag-
nitude outcomes.
Manipulation Check
After the 20 discounting-related questions, participants
were presented with manipulation check questions in-
volving the rating of worry (on a 0 to 100 scale) for
items mentioning both small intensity illness (e.g.,
BImagine that a doctor diagnosed you with body paral-
ysis of low intensity^) and large intensity illness (e.g.,
BImagine that a doctor diagnosed you with body
paralysis^). Thus, participants had to rate 3 medical
conditions×2 intensity states, making a total of six
questions presented in random order to participants.
We assumed that the reduction of worry (between high
and low intensity) should be higher for a divisible ill-
ness as compared to an indivisible one. The results con-
firmed our expectations (see Table 4).
Indeed, participants rated high-intensity cancer higher
on the worry scale than low-intensity cancer (a difference
of 9.25 points on the 0–100-point scale); they also did the
same for body paralysis (by 16.36 points) and for acne
(by 23.96 points, on average). However, the decrease in
worry between the high and low conditions was the
highest for the easily graduated condition of acne, smaller
for body paralysis, and lowest for brain cancer (as dem-
onstrated by paired t tests: p<.001 in all cases). Thus, we
conclude that in general receiving treatment that partially
treats brain cancer results in less happiness than receiving
treatment that partially treats (by the same proportion)
body paralysis or acne.
Moreover, our study sample was highly disciplined
with respect to reading instructions. Only 7 out of 183
participants failed to read long and boring instructions
carefully, providing an answer to the first part of the
question rather than acceding to the final request in
the concluding IMC task (Oppenheimer et al. 2009):
this can be interpreted as a successful sample validation.
3 Using the algorithm for identifying nonsystematic data proposed by
Johnson and Bickel (2008) resulted in exclusion rates of 32 % and
25 % for Studies 3 and 4, respectively, but, again, in the interests of
comparability, we used the simplified criterion proposed by Weatherly
and Terrell (2014).
4 Since transforming probability into odds against is known to heavily
influence AUC by responses at the longest odds, we recalculated AUC
data with no transformation employed. The results of Experiments 3 and
4 would not have differed had we employed this method of calculating
AUC.
Table 2 Details of participants in Studies 1 and 2 before and after employing exclusionary criteria
Original sample After employing exclusionary criteria
N Males % Age M Age SD N Males % Age M Age SD Reduction
Study 1 85 62 35.17 11.15 42 60 37.43 12.27 50.59 %
Study 2 82 54 35.83 11.02 44 59 35.93 10.99 46.34 %
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General Discussion
In the novel titled The Gambler, published by Fyodor Dosto-
yevsky (1996) in 1866, the main character takes high risks in a
casino and does not leave the roulette table with money that is
already won because he needs a specific sum of money to pay
the debts of a lady he is in lovewith. He is not interested in any
sum smaller than this amount because a lower amount will not
help. In short, there are situations where only a complete out-
come, and not a partial outcome, matters. Such situations do
not only occur in fiction.
Weatherly and Terrell (2014) argued that in time
discounting both medical and monetary outcomes, small out-
comes are discounted more steeply than large outcomes. It
should be noted, however, that the repeated measures
ANOVA reported for time discounting on p. 436 of their pa-
per, BF(1, 81)=3.95, p=0.050, η2=0.046^, had a very small
effect size associated with it and that p was close to (if not
equal to) a nonsignificant value. We replicated Weatherly and
Terrell’s study and demonstrated that, for money discounting,
small amounts are discounted more steeply than larger
amounts, but that a similar phenomenon does not occur for
medical outcomes when large and small are defined as cancer
and acne, respectively, F(1, 41)=2.94; p=.094; η2=.067.
However, when using divisible medical outcomes (paralysis
and acne), so that the situation vis-a-vis divisibility was com-
parable to that for money, we found an effect similar to that
obtained for monetary outcomes, with a higher discount rate
for smaller than for larger medical outcomes, F(1, 43)=7.41;
p=.009; η2=.147. This confirmed our expectation that divis-
ible medical outcomes would behave in the same way as di-
visible monetary outcomes.
For probability discounting, Weatherly and Terrell ob-
served differences in the discounting of monetary and medical
outcomes. Large monetary values were discounted more
steeply than small values, but small medical outcomes were
discounted more steeply than large outcomes. However, the
effect size associated with the repeated measures ANOVA for
medical outcomes (where large was defined as cancer and
small as acne) on p. 438 of Weatherly and Terrell’s paper,
BF(1, 129)=4.94, p=0.028, η2=.037,^ again indicated a very
small observed effect, and the effect was not observed at all in
our replication study, F(1, 49)=3.38; p=.072; η2=.064. After
substituting nondivisible cancer with divisible paralysis, the
effect was negligible, F(1, 46)=.04; p=.847; η2=.001, with
large medical outcomes discounted at the same rate as small
medical outcomes. Hence, the manipulation introduced did
not alter probability discounting in the manner expected.
The manipulation-check part of the study showed that the
(dis)utility drop associated with declining illness levels (from
high to low intensity) is smaller for some severe illnesses
(such as cancer) than for other severe illnesses (such as paral-
ysis), with the former being less divisible than the latter.
Therefore, people would probably behave differently when
(as in Studies 3 and 4) choosing between two treatments,
one of which completely cures the disease but works for only
Table 3 Details of participants in Studies 3 and 4 before and after employing exclusionary criteria
Original sample After employing exclusionary criteria
N Males % Age M Age SD N Males % Age M Age SD Reduction
Study 3 75 55 34.12 11.25 50 54 35.94 10.92 33.33 %











Study 1: Money Study 1: Medical
(acne-cancer)













Fig. 1 Mean AUC values for
each outcome discounted in
Study 1 (on the left, panel a) and
Study 2 (on the right, panel b).
The error bars represent one
standard error of the mean for all
participants
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a certain percentage of the patients who choose it, and one of
which is guaranteed to work but only partially treats the dis-
ease (as expressed by a certain percentage). Having a small
brain tumor is almost equally as bad as having a large one: a
person can die from either. Therefore, partial tumor reduction
would probably be avoided in favor of even a small chance of
full recovery, and a disproportionately greater percentage
chance of success would be demanded in the case of the latter
treatment to compensate for even a small chance of full recov-
ery offered by the former treatment. Ultimately, in this situa-
tion, a patient should be less impulsive compared to a patient
suffering from a divisible illness such as paralysis. Thus, al-
though Weatherly and Terrell’s (2014) testing of their hypoth-
esis was problematic, and although we did not manage to
replicate their findings, the rationale for the hypothesis tested
still remains appealing: for nondivisible medical outcomes
people might engage in steeper small discounting rather than
large probability discounting, but for divisible medical out-
comes they should behave as they do for divisible monetary
outcomes – with steeper discounting of large payoffs than
small payoffs.
We believe that a particularly complicated answering par-
adigm could at least partially explain such results. Respon-
dents usually have trouble when scaling their attitudes on ratio
scales: when asked open ended questions such as BWhat is the
smallest amount of money (minimum percentage of success)
you would be willing to accept,^ they could treat the whole
situation as a bargaining process and make high declarations
because more money (or a greater chance of success) is
always better than less. In consequence, scale sensitivity
deteriorates significantly. Thus, in further replication stud-
ies other choice based methods should be used, such as
(1) adjusting procedures (often referred to as multiple-
choice methods; Weatherly, 2014; Weatherly & Derenne,
2011, 2013) or (2) the choice-based conjoint method
(Bialek, Markiewicz, & Sawicki, 2015; Czupryna,
Kubińska, & Markiewicz, 2014).
Differences in results between our study andWeatherly and
Terrell’s study can be partially attributed to sample character-
istics. While the two experiments in the latter study recruited
from a University participant pool within a college population
(mean ages 20 and 20.8 years; 68 % and 84 % females), our
sample consisted of a (more diverse) group of AMT volun-
teers. Moreover, our sample was older and better balanced in
terms of gender (M=36.46 years, SD=11.90; 44 % females).
Because of the age difference, our participants may have been
more sensitive to medical outcomes (the relevance of this
topic to participants would be likely to increase with age) or
generally more patient. Also, it has been suggested that in
general AMT workers are more rational than samples drawn
from other populations (Hardisty, Thompson, Krantz, & We-
ber 2013b). In fact, the present impressive results for the IMC
task show that our sample carefully read the instructions, pay-
ing attention to details, and support the idea that the AMT is a
valuable tool for conducting discounting studies (Goodman,
Cryder, & Cheema, 2013).
Table 4 Manipulation check:
Hypothetical worry when
suffering from acne, brain cancer,
or body paralysis (of both low and
high intensity). Base: All
respondents participating in
Studies 1 to 4, N=183
LOW intensity HIGH intensity Difference
M SD M SD M SD T p
Acne 18.28 19.50 42.24 28.48 -23.96 22.34 -14.50 <.001
Brain cancer 87.35 19.32 96.60 12.39 -9.25 17.11 -7.31 <.001











Study 3: Money Study 3: Medical
(acne-cancer)













Fig. 2 Mean AUC values for
each outcome discounted in
Study 3 (left, Panel a) and Study 4
(right, Panel b). The error bars
represent one standard error of the
mean for all participants
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Limitations
In the interests of fully replicating Weatherly and Terrell’s
(2014) study we followed their approach while consciously
acknowledging its limitations. Thus, similarly to Weatherly
and Terrell, we used a simplified version of Johnson and
Bickel’s (2008) exclusion criteria, although it might be argued
that all exclusion criteria should have been applied. We also
used the same delay periods as Weatherly and Terrell
(6 months, 1 year, 3 years, 5 years, and 10 years). A potential
limitation here is that a person with brain cancer would prob-
ably not want to wait for treatment and that a large amount of
discounting would occur between 1 day and 6 months. Equiv-
alents of monetary outcomes were provided on a different
scale (in money) than equivalents for medical outcomes (in
percentages). Thus, making direct comparisons is question-
able. We did not measure approximate money equivalents
for a given disease – it might questioned whether they are
comparable even though there are studies controlling this pa-
rameter (e.g., Chapman, 1996). Also, the scenario provided to
participants, by virtue of its complicated choice structure, may
have been difficult for participants to understand (resulting in
quite high exclusion rates). Finally, participants may have
been incapable of imagining that they were suffering from
brain cancer or paralysis.
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